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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, DC 20310

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

DAMI-ZA

16 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY ROWEN

The Problem for the Soviets in Managing the East Europeans SUBJECT:

- You asked for comments on your essay outlining this problem. It addresses dimensions of the problem heretofore ignored, and it puts the issues of East European centrifugal forces in several dynamic perspectives. Slightly expanded, it would make a good IIM or SNIE.
- I believe, however, that it falls short of the larger aim: a comprehensive understanding of the Soviet leadership of the Warsaw Pact in face of many centrifugal forces. I recently assembled a group under Dale Herspring for discussing these issues. We agreed that before asking the question about Soviet control and East European resistance, we need a comprehensive investigation of the organizational structure of the armies of Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. That would include their ties to the Soviet military and the KGB, the militaryindustrial relations, the Soviet mechanisms for influencing East European military industrial dynamics, and any other institutional or political factors bearing on the matter. DIA does not track these armies in any comprehensive fashion except to count the forces. No one else has a good record on them. The military-industrial links are wholly ignored as well as police and party links.
- 3. We also agreed that we should not ask the questions about East European military reliability until answers to the above questions and issues are developed.
- 4. My basic reaction to your paper is that it mixes the two tasks, asking good questions about the organizational infrastructure but also tying them to the political control issue. If we must move quickly to an IIM or SNIE, then your paper is the way to go. If we can afford a two-phase approach, then I favor that. I personally feel too ignorant of the institutional arrangements to leap over the first phase. For example, had I better understood the organization, I would have suspected the martial law crackdown in December 1981. I did not because I believed the population had too close relations with both the

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DAMI-ZA SUBJECT: The Problem for the Soviets in Managing th	16 July 1982 ee East Europeans
police and the army. In fact, they did not.	

5. I shall be out of town for a few days, but I hope these remarks are useful until I can think more about the problem.

WILNIAM E. ODOM Major General, USA ACofS for Intelligence 25X1 25X1